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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BURT,

)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

)

CASE NO:

)

PRIORITY: 14b

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

890190-CA

BETTY MAE BURT,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A careful review of the Appellant's Brief would indicate the painstaking process taken of reviewing the trial
record

and

the

Court

transcript

for

proper

citation

to

evidence presented in order to substantiate the evidentiary
facts set forth in the Appellant's Brief.
A
several

review

of

instances

the

Respondent's

would

indicate

Statement
paragraphs

of

Facts

in

of

purported

evidentiary facts which are totally unsupported by citation
to the trial record or the trial transcript.

This Court ir

the event of discrepancies in the facts as set forth between
the Appellant's and Rerpondent's Statement of Facts should
lend greater credence to the version support by citation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The

Trial

Court

did

abuse

its

discretion

in

failing to properly consider certain marital assets as set

-1-

forth and in awarding to the Respondent in essence a part of
the Appellant's inheritance.
2.

The

Trial

Court

abused

its

discretion

in

the

amount of alimony award to the Appellant.
3.

The Trial Court abused its discretion in the award

of an interest of the Respondent in Appellantfs inheritance.
4.

The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing

to enter

proper

and equitable

Findings

of Fact

and Con-

clusions of Law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER AND ENTER A
FINDING IN REGARDS TO THE RESPONDENT'S
SURVIVOR ANNUITY BENEFITS AND RETIREMENT
AS PERSONAL PROPERTY ASSETS ACQUIRED
DURING THE MARRIAGE.
The Respondent, again without resitation to the trial
record or the trial transcript, would imply that the Trial
Court did properly take into consideration in its division
of property between the parties, the fact that the Respondent did have

a survivor

annuity benefit acquired

during

this 42 year marriage.
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the Trial Court failed
to enter a finding or a conclusion of law in regards to an
award

or

a

consideration

annuity benefit.

of

the

Respondent's

survivor

The Respondent correctly indicates it is

an insurance policy and if the Respondent were to die his
designated survivor would receive an annuity in the form of
a portion of his retirement.

This annuity, after 42 years

of marriage, should be awarded to the Appellant.

The Trial

Court abused its discretion in not entering a finding as to
the annuity

and in failing to award the survivor annuity

benefit to the Appellant.
The Trial Court did abuse its discretion in failing to
consider the Respondent's retirement as a marital asset.

It

did address the retirement as income due to the Respondent,
but there was no award of that retirement benefit as personal property accumulated during 42 years of marriage.

The

Trial Court simply considered the retirement as income and
awarded to the Appellant alimony of $300.00 per month which
would automatically terminate upon remarriage, cohabitation
or

the

Appellant's

considered

death.

The

property

was

incorrectly

as income rather than a marital asset and the

Trial Court abused its discretion in so considering it under
Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1987}.

POINT

11.
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ONLY AWARDING THE SUM OF $300.00 PER
MONTH AS AND FOR ALIMONY.
In

response

to

the

Respondent's

Brief

on

alimony,

Appellant would simply refer this Court to the Appellant's

_-}_

Argument under its Point II, that in consideration of the
property division,

(which is inequitable as argued in the

previous Points in Appellant's Brief),
the Trial Court to make proper
Stevens,
Paffel,

754

P.2d

952

732 P.2d

97

(Utah

(Utah

and the failure by

findings under Stevens v.

App.

1986),

1988),

and

Paffel

that this Court

v.

should

reconsider by its own authority the alimony award or remand
to the Trial Court

for further

consideration

and

further

entry of Findings of Fact as to the Appellant's ability to
provide

sufficient

eration

of

the

income

property

for

herself

distribution

and

for

reconsid-

as

affecting

the

alimony award,

POINT III,
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT AN INTEREST
IN THE APPELL/iNT1 S LIENS ON HER INHERITED PROPERTY.
Respondent's Point III with only one citation to case
law

sets

forth

a

barrage

of

unsupport

factual

evidence

indicating that the income including the inheritance of the
Appellant's
Respondent's

was
was

the Appellant's
also

the

while

Appellant's.

any

income

The

Trial

of

the

Court

found that the Appellant became employed with the Respondent
paying all of their living expense but that the Appellant
spent her money as she pleased with her money with an offset

by the Respondent's use of the watch repair money for his
private use.

Regardless, the Respondent is asking the Court

to penalize in effect, the Appellant, and admittedly award
to

the Appellant

marital
This

assets

less than her one-half

due to her

inheritance

inheritance was wisely

interest

in

invested by

1968

in the

and 1972.

the Appellant to

produce an increase as testified to by both the Appellant
and the Respondent and that at no time did the Appellant
co-mingle but in fact continually maintained as separate the
inheritance and the monies earned thereby.

The Respondent

would seem to imply that the Appellant is only entitled to
her one-half of the assets acquired during the marriage if
the Appellant simply maintained the $71,000.00 in some kind
of a savings account or Certificate of Deposit rather than
vigorously investing that inheritance in stocks, bonds, or
other types of investments that allowed a greater increase.
As argued
failure

of

the

earlier
Trial

in Appellant's
Court

to

Brief, there was a

consider

several

of

the

marital assets in its "equitable" division of property and
as argued earlier in Appellant's Brief, the Trial Court did
abuse

its

discretion

in

awarding

to

the

Respondent,

in

effect, an interest in the Appellant!s inheritance and gain
therefrom.

-S-

The Appellant worked from the mid 1960fs on as admitted
by the Respondent, working part-time and then full-time at
Whitehead Electric, contributing to the upkeep of the home,
making improvements to the home and in purchasing furniture
for

the

home.

(Ironically,

Respondent

was

awarded

full

Appellant

had

interest in that home.)
The
acquired

Respondent's
or

amassed

statements
assets

that

in the

the

sum of

$195,340.00

as

compared to the Respondent's savings of $28,000.00 is not
only unfounded but misleading.

Seventy-one thousand dollars

($71,000.00) of the $195,000.00 was an inheritance acquired
more than

14 years ago, a base

from which the Appellant

wisely invested the monies to allow an increase and which
came only as a result of a death of her parents and which
monies were

never

co-mingled

but maintained

separate

and

apart from marital funds.
The

Respondent

is

requesting

that

the

Appellant

be

penalized for maintaining her sole inheritance as a separate
property by

following

law as spelled out

in Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 204 (Utah 1988), rather than co-mingling
the

properties.

Respondent

advocates

that

due

to

her

refusal to co-mingle, Appellant should not receive her half
of the marital estate.

The Court abused its discretion in failing to consider
several of the marital assets and in awarding to the Respondent a portion of the Appellant1s inheritance.

POINT IV.
THE APPELLANT HAS PREVAILED IN SHOWING
IN HER ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND THIS COURT
SHOULD SUBSTITUTE A JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF
THE TRIAL COURT OR REMAND FOR APPROPRIATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW.
The

Respondent

Commissioner
conclusion

refers

Richards

entered

by

as
a

an

to

the

pre-trial

evidentiary

finder

of

fact

finding

hearing
as

by

with

lending

a

some

further credibility and viability to the ultimate decision
entered by Judge Stanton M. Taylor, the trial Judge.
law as well as a review of the statutes clearly

Case

indicate

that the Commissioner sitting for 30 minutes in a pre-trial
settlement conference is not a finder of fact as witnesses
are not sworn, testimony is not taken from sworn witnesses,
and testimony is only proffered by the parties1 attorneys.
A Commissioner

in this sense is not a finder of fact and

cannot be considered so where testimonies are not given frcm
sworn witnesses nor from the parties.

No further credibil-

ity should be given to Judge Stanton M. Taylor's decision
because Commissioner Richards in a preliminary type hearing

made

similar

recommendations.

The

Trial

Court

is

still

under the obligation to enter sufficient Findings of Fact
and Conclusions

of Law as cited

in earlier cases and to

enter an equitable division of the marital property of the
parties in consideration of earlier cited cases, in particular Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra.
This Court should not substitute its judgment for that
of the finder of fact unless it is apparent that the finder
of fact abused its discretion by either not following the
law or by making an interpretation of fact that is simply
not supported.

A careful review of the arguments of the

Appellant would

indicate that there has been an abuse of

discretion in failing to enter and consider certain factors
critical in making an equitable distribution of the marital
assets and the case should either be remanded for further
findings, further consideration or this Court should use its
authority to correct the decision of the trial Judge.
The Respondent in the case that the Appellant does not
agree with the decision because it attempts to equalize her
financial

position

without

that

of

her

husband.

As

the

facts indicate under the testimony, the financial position
of the parties was not equal nor should it be made so.

The

Appellant inherited without any act of the Respondent's, and
as case law allows, she maintained separate and apart from

the marital assets the sum of approximately $71,000.00 which
increased in value due to her efforts.

Immediately upon the

inheritance and thereafter due to the growth in the inheritance monies and a failure of squandering those funds, the
positions financially of the parties were not, nor would the
be, in an equal position, and if the Court was and apparently

is, attempting

to

equalize

their

positions,

that

is

clearly an abuse of discretion under Mortensen and the other
inheritance
manifestation

cases

cited

of greed

and

referred

on behalf

request that she not be penalized
that she received

to.

There

is

no

of the Appellant but a
due to the

inheritance

from her parents which she meticulous." v

labored in maintaining

in separate and apart from marital

assets and refused to co-mingle.
Although the Trial Court in domestic proceedings cannot
give back the peoples lives in this case nor can they alter
concepts, perceived ideas nor living habits, the Court can
do equity in awarding to the parties, or at least forcing
the Trial' Court

to enter

sufficient

findings

of Fact

co

allow this Court to make a determination as to why inheritance not co-mingled and considered solely and asset of the
Appellant should partially be awarded to the Respondent in
giving less than an equal share of the marital assets to the
Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
The Respondent in its Reply Brief has not raised any
sustainable

objections

or

challenges

to

the

Appellant!s

Brief but has simply relied on a contortion and melodramatic
presentation of

the facts in an attempt to convince this

Court that due to the meticulous care of an inheritance the
Appellant should penalized in receiving less than her equal
share of the marital assets or even a consideration of how
those assets were considered in the "equitable" division of
properties•
RESPECTFULLY
1990.

SUBMITTED

this

J^ y

day

of

January,
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